

Concealed Carry Permits: Catalyst or Deterrent? A State-by-State Look Into How a Change From No-Issue To Shall-Issue Affects Crime Rates

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Abstract

This study is a state-by-state look into whether or not the changing of a jurisdiction from no-issue to shall-issue, in terms of firearm right to carry laws, results in more or less violent and or property crime. In this study, the independent variable is the selected jurisdiction's concealed carry permit laws. The dependent variables are the rates of violent crime, property crime and specific crime rate averages. This study focuses on handgun ownership and crime rates in relation to three key sociological theories; Anomie, Labeling, and Conflict. The data for this study were obtained from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. The particular states and jurisdictions chosen were selected by looking at which jurisdictions had changed from *no-issue* in terms of RTC laws to *shall-issue* in the last 20 years within the United States. In the six states that went from *no-issue* to *shall-issue*, three had significant decreases in murder and non-negligent manslaughter, which shows a positive correlation between a reduction in gun control legislation and a reduction in murder. Further research is likely needed to determine whether unaccounted for variables are the result of this nationwide decrease, or if right-to-carry laws have a causal relationship with specific violent crimes.

Introduction

It seems that not a day goes by in which some tragic atrocity does not plague the headlines with the loss of human lives at the hands of disturbed individuals and the guns they wield.

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Underneath this frenzy of newspaper headlines, breaking news, political agendas and promises-for-action rests a quintessential question that has lived since the birth of the second amendment. What laws should be enacted to best govern the purchase, use, ownership and handling of guns? In an attempt to make sure this question is not answered hastily by politicians eager to ride issue-coattails or use the gun-control debate in a calculated attempt to become popular, this study will conduct original research that examines how handguns are being integrated into everyday use. This study will be looking at permitting policies in the United States and seeing how the rates of violent crime and property crime fluctuate as a state changes from *no-issue* to *shall-issue*. The results will hopefully help determine whether or not citizens carrying guns affect crime rates.

The most profound study done on right-to-carry laws was conducted by John Lott and David Mustard in 1997, where they claimed to find that right-to-carry (henceforth abbreviated "RTC") laws were a driving force behind falling rates of violent crime (Donahue and Aneja, 2011:568). In 2005, the National Research Council brought together top scholars to conduct a study and truly test the "More Guns, Less Crime" hypothesis proposed by Lott and Mustard. No common conclusion was found, and the topic of gun ownership influencing crime and deterrence is still largely up for debate. Their research designs tested state crime rates before and after the passing of RTC laws.

This study is unique in that it will be looking at some of the most recent states to specifically make the change from *no-issue* to *shall-issue*. This study includes recent data which make sure any historical abnormalities in crime rates are included, unlike Lott and Mustard's research which was largely criticized for not analyzing other explanations for the large crime drop in the 1990s.

Does the changing of a jurisdiction from *no-issue* to *shall-issue* result in more or less violent crime and property crime? In this study, the independent variable will be the selected jurisdiction's concealed carry permit laws. The dependent variables are the rates of violent crime, property crime and specific crime rate averages.

It is hypothesized that as a jurisdiction changes from *no-issue* to *shall-issue*, the rates of violent crime and property crime will not increase, and the rates of violent crime will decrease.

This study will focus on handgun ownership and crime rates in relation to three key sociological theories; Anomie, Labeling, and Conflict. Anomie is important when looking at the concealed carry laws because obtaining such a permit and carrying a gun can be caused by increased strain – and result in an individual taking control of their family's lives. Owning a concealed weapons permit is a possible innovative means for reducing strain.

Labeling theory is important to consider because if people know someone is carrying a concealed weapon, they are either labeled as a “constitutional gun lover” or some kind of “street thug” looking to cause trouble. Either label, once incorporated and absorbed by the individual, can have enormous influences on the gun carrier's personal identity. Being labeled as a “badass with a gun,” could result in increased aggression in an attempt to “play the part” of what they believe society expects from them.

The last theory that will be explored in-depth will be conflict theory. There is an interest from the upper-class to keep guns out of the hands of urban minority youth. RTC laws may be an expression of this very interest because citizens with felonies cannot obtain the permits and very few individuals from the upper-class are convicted of felonies. However, minorities and lower class citizens being able to carry concealed handguns can be seen as a way for them to gain personal power and control of their own destiny – but this also ends up giving them a false sense of protection that leaves them vulnerable to less “personal crime” such as fraud, embezzlement and other white collar crimes.

Does the changing of a jurisdiction from *no-issue* to *shall-issue* result in more or less violent crime and property crime? Before taking on the topic by conducting original research, it is important to first take note of all of the significant research that has asked similar questions.

Literature Review

Besides being an extremely hot topic for politicians and the media, gun control as a whole is an extremely well researched topic. Researchers and the public at large want to know whether an increase in gun control laws leads to more or less crime.

The specific topics of the studies vary by a fair amount because there are so many precise variables that can be examined and compared to gun control issues. This literature review will note significant research done pointing to each of the different conclusions about gun control and crime rates, while making note of the most substantial claims and faults of each. It will also look at how labeling theory, conflict theory and anomie theory are still applicable to the research question.

Anomie, labeling and conflict theory are still the theories that relate best to this study. Anomie is present in every research project that examines the relationship between gun ownership and violence, and this study is no exception. Whether carrying a concealed handgun is viewed as a representation of reducing one's own anomie or a display of an anomic past, carrying a concealed handgun can be caused by an increased strain in someone's life and is an innovative means for reducing that strain. Labeling theory comes up in the studies surrounding the issue of gun control and crime, whether it is the label of an honor culture or a gun culture in general. The rationales for the label may formalize during an individual's self-identity crisis as a result of being labeled a gun owner. Finally, conflict theory is especially evident in studies such as Celinska's "Individualism And Collectivism In America: The Case of Gun Ownership And Attitudes Toward Gun Control" (2007), where widespread gun ownership leads to the conclusion that our culture is trending toward individualistic tendencies and shedding off collectivistic cultural attitudes. Conflict theory also comes into play when debating the effects of shall-issue right-to-carry (RTC) laws with may-issue laws, where discretion is present. With all three of these theories in mind, the research question of whether or not a state's RTC laws change crime rates still poses interesting and engaging correlations with each theory. This review of the literature will begin with a brief analysis of the relevance and fragility surrounding research statistics before it breaks down the issue of RTC laws and firearm violence into three distinct categories, two of which have contradicting statistical results, and one section that suggests gun control legislation should be focused on an entirely different set of statistics.

Understanding The Facts

Research on the effects of Right-To-Carry (RTC) laws and firearm violence has produced a variety of statistics that can and have been used to support different perspectives on the issue.

La Valle and Glover (2012) explain how when researching statistics related to legal policy that “adding or removing even a single covariate or control frequently changes the magnitude, direction or significance of the policy effects, thus leaving one unsure if the effects are actually negative, positive, or if they even exist at all” (2012: 582). What can be drawn from this statement and from the wide range of study results for RTC law effects (as explored below), is that research on this topic must be sensitive: It cannot be overly speculative. It needs only to draw conclusions where they can be reasonably inferred. Otherwise, research runs the risk of becoming ammunition for partisan media as sociological validity becomes cannon fodder. The intensity surrounding the topic of RTC laws and gun control is politically driven. This places a burden on the social scientist. As an issue becomes a breaking headline, simultaneously, its facts evolve or become replaced with stereotypes that justify democratic legislative action, embodying the will of the people. The point is that it is important to look at research statistics to see how they vary from study to study and to see what statistics appear to be the most relevant and valid for use in legal policy. This way, with the people informed, democratic action has the best chance of reducing the problems that plague its societies.

Varied Statistics

For understanding the merits of deterrence theory, it is crucial to understand that the facts surrounding firearm use vary from study to study. Using a “guilty until proven innocent mindset” is necessary, as renowned scholars on both sides of the gun control issue have created, found and reported contradicting statistics. For example, research indicating the percentage of crimes involving firearms varies greatly. Zimring (2004) found that, “guns are only used in 4 percent of all crime, and only 20 percent of all violent crime but about 70 percent of all criminal killings” (2004: 34). Kappeler and Potter (2005) cite lower levels of gun usage with firearms present in only 7% of all violent crimes (2005: 45), a significantly less threatening percentage than the former. Research on the prevalence of defensive gun use in the United States is also v

Kleck and Gertz (1995) indicate that there are about 2.5 million defensive gun uses in the United States annually, while Cook (2002) says that the range is lower, giving a conservative estimate of 32,000 to 500,000 defensive uses based on NCVS data.

The magnitude of the difference between these two findings is striking for anyone interested in the gun control debate, as the number of successful defenses from attackers is often weighed against the quantity of unintentional firearm deaths to measure the relevance of the deterrence hypothesis. However, there are certain statistics that are reported consistently from study to study. These tend to be primary data pulled from government databases like the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) or the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS).

Reports of firearm homicide rates, and unintentional firearm deaths can generally be trusted. Price et al. (2004) mentions how 65 percent of all homicide victims were killed with firearms (2004: 272) and that there were 776 unintentional firearm deaths in the year 2000, while adding how "firearm injuries are second only to motor vehicles as leading cause of injury deaths" (2004: 271). Siegel (2012) confirms that two-thirds of all homicide victims are killed with firearms. Kleck (2009) states that there were 730 unintentional firearm deaths in 2003, and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) data indicate 606 accidental deaths for 2010. This shows that annual data for unintentional firearm deaths appear to have consistent ranges, despite the fact that separate databases and jurisdictions may define the term differently.

More Guns, Less Crime:

John Lott and David Mustard (1997) used county level crime data for the entire United States from 1977 to 1992, with the purpose of investigating the effects of "shall issue" right-to-carry (RTC) concealed handgun laws (1997: 5). They found that allowing citizens without criminal records or mental illness to carry concealed handguns deters violent crimes while producing minor and statistically insignificant changes in accidental deaths. Lott and Mustard predicted that if all states had adopted shall issue right-to-carry laws in 1992, that at least 1,414 murders would have been prevented, that over 4,177 rapes would have been avoided (1997: 64), and that an annual gain of 5.74 billion dollars would have resulted. Other studies confirm similar findings. FlorenzPlassmann and John Whitley (2003) conducted a study, mirroring the methods of Lott and Mustard, by studying county level crime data for the entire United States from 1977 until the year 2000.

They found annual reductions in murder rates between 1.5% and 2.3% for each additional year that a right-to-carry law was in effect.

For the first five years a RTC law was in effect, the total financial benefit from reduced crimes in the counties that switched their RTC laws was between 2 billion and 3 billion dollars (2003: 1365).

The aim of Lott and Mustard's study was to show that in the United States there is a bias against gun ownership, thanks to the media highlighting massacres and unintentional firearm deaths. This bias leads to anti-gun legislation which in turn devalues the idea that violent crime can be deterred with firearms. Lott argues that this legislation is ineffective in reducing violence because it creates more vulnerability to crime. This occurs because gun control laws reduce the quantity of guns in law-abiding citizen's households, meaning potential victims of crime are going to be less armed. The idea behind Lott and Mustard's deterrent effect fits directly into Routine Activities Theory (Siegel, 2012: 83), where a personal firearm is synonymous with a "capable guardian," therefore reducing the "suitability of the target" and deterring a "likely offender." This lowers the expected cost and overall risk of committing a particular crime, which makes any profit from illegal activity seem more ideal because there is less risk in achieving it. Therefore, according to Lott, an increase in gun control leads to an increase in crime rates because there is less risk for criminals.

This is why he advocates for less gun legislation, which in turns leads to more guns and less crime. Lott and Mustard even noted that felons commented during the interviews that committing a late-night burglary is "the way to get shot." The core idea of this statement is confirmed by interviews done by Cook (2002), but Cook found that evidence supporting gun ownership as a deterrent to burglary is weak and that firearms could serve as inducement (2002: 2). Wright and Decker (1994) confirm this same idea quoting a burglar who states, "A gun is money with a trigger," which suggests that to certain individuals, extreme *severity* resulting from a crime is not a rational deterrent. However, if *certainty* of repercussion was increased, it is possible the deterrence would as well. Nevertheless, to many individuals and to the rational actor of these theories, the threat of a lethal defense most surely has the capability of deterring an action, and this why Lott and Mustard's more guns less crime proposal is so attractive.

An important distinction between more guns less crime, and more guns more death, is that those concerned with reducing crime, such as Lott and Mustard, are less concerned with accidental handgun deaths, which occurred 606 times throughout the US in 2011 (CDC).

Rather, theorists of this kind are concerned with the potential 2.5 million (Kleck, 2009) defensive gun uses that occur every year. Even the low estimates for defensive handgun use per year indicate that there are just over 32,000 defensive handgun uses each year, and out of those 32,000 uses, 98.9% of criminals were deterred (Cook, 2002: 5). Statistics such as these explain why Lott and Mustard believe that gun control laws attempting to prevent unintentional handgun deaths are irrelevant if they contribute to a rise in homicide and rape rates that affect thousands of Americans. They argue that these horrendous crimes could have been prevented with lethal, personal deterrents like firearms.

Gary Kleck (2009) looked at the most notorious and fear inspiring criminal firearm scenarios by looking at mass shootings in schools, specifically at the Columbine incident. He looked to see if there was any evidence that supported or rebuffed the idea of more guns less crime. The first statistic of note is that in the U.S., all massacres involving death tolls greater than 32 persons have been committed with explosives and/or fire. Kleck looked at seven publicized massacres that occurred between October 1st, 1997 and May 30th 1999, for a total time spanning 19 months. In five of the seven incidents, the killers used multiple guns and were able to use their spare guns to fend off victims as they reloaded (Kleck, 2009).

This led Kleck to conclude that the theory stating that high capacity magazines are an important enabler in mass shootings is false, and that the amount of rounds contained in one magazine is irrelevant if the shooter has multiple weapons that can be used while reloading. Another important finding from Kleck's study was that mass shooting killers don't spray an area with bullets and shoot victims as fast as possible – they instead fire deliberately over fairly long periods of time (2009: 1451). For example, Columbine was a 49 minute shooting spree involving 37 casualties and around 99 separate explosive devices, most of which were not detonated. "Even the shootings with the largest number of rounds fired in the shortest period of time would not have taxed the rate of fire capacities of ordinary six shot revolvers" (2009: 1451).

However, it is debatable if Kleck is successful in marginalizing gun control when focusing on assault weapon bans (legislation focused on military style weapons), as assault weapons may offer better muzzle control and quicker targeting. Casualties of shooting massacres do not occur in an averaged time versus casualty fashion, but rather in segments of movement and bursts of shooting.

As a result, being able to hold thirty rounds in a magazine might provide a better opportunity for killing innocents and holding off attempts at defensive attacks.

An attacker juggling three weapons with multiple ten round magazines would have an increased vulnerability to brave victims looking or listening for opportunities to fight back.

Kleck also noted that four of the seven major incidences he studied involved firearms that were stolen (2009: 1454) and that overall, according to NCVS-data, there are over half a million gun-thefts every year in the United States (2009: 1454). Wright and Rossi (1986) confirm the relevance of theft as an acquisition method for acquiring a firearm from their survey data, which indicated that 70 percent of criminals knew or believed the weapon(s) they used were stolen. A common question that comes up is whether or not putting locks on guns is the right way to reduce gun thefts. For those like Kleck, Lott and Mustard who support the more guns, less crime hypothesis, locking up a weapon only marginally reduces the chance of a criminal acquiring that weapon but it adds significant time to the defensive capability of the firearm. It also may remove the weapon's ability to act as a "guardian" (Siegel, 2012: 83), and instead may turn the firearm into an expensive, "attractive target" that can easily be stolen. This also decreases potential deterrence (Kleck, 2009: 1456).

More Guns, More Crime

Several scholars have noted distinct problems with Lott and Mustard's (1997) analysis finding that an increase in the presence of guns actually increases crime rates. Ian Ayres and John Donohue (2002) acknowledge the fact that concealed carry handgun laws present an unobservable precaution that may deter the criminal whereas a visible precaution would simply displace criminal activity (2002: 9). This is the theoretical and utilitarian advantage that a concealed weapons permit can have on a society, and the theory is not rejected.

Lott and Mustard's statistics however, are rejected. Ayres and Donohue added five years of county data and seven years of state data to Lott and Mustard's data, allowing them to test an additional 14 jurisdictions that had adopted shall-issue laws. Lott and Mustard's findings collapse under the context of these new statistics (2002: 54).

Ayres and Donahue found that shall-issue laws are actually associated with higher levels of crime (2002: 44). Their analysis showed that robbery is not affected by the shall-issue laws in Lott and Mustard's results, causing serious theoretical concerns for the effects of deterrence on violent crime. It is possible that robberies and violence were displaced rather than prevented, pushing criminals toward stealthier property crimes (2002: 31).

A critique is made of Lott and Mustard's coding system that it drops data. There are a substantial number of counties that are missing information for certain crime categories as a result of being coded with a "0," which could indicate that no crime was observed. Excluding these jurisdictions that have no crime rate or that do not benefit from shall-issue laws potentially biases the results in favor of crime deterrence (2002: 31). This leads to a situation where findings are overly sensitive to jurisdictions with large populations that have been in the data set for a longer period of time than other states (2002: 26). An example would include the state of Texas, that had a data set with 11 more years than Maine's (2002: 26).

Dan Black and Daniel Nagin (1998) bring up a similar critique saying that "without Florida, there is no evidence of any impact on homicide or rapes" (1998: 214). They conducted a study that repeated Lott and Mustard's (1997) methods, and suggested that Florida's thriving drug trade in the 1980s, combined with a unique culture that spends a significant amount of time outdoors, could have solely accounted for the results found by Lott and Mustard. They strongly rejected Lott and Mustard's assumption of a deterrent effect across all states (1998:217) and found no significant correlation between RTC laws and crime rates.

Another study, "The Impact of Right-to Carry Laws and the NRC Report" written by AbhayAneja, John Donohue and Alexandria Zhang (2011) found that with the evidence at the time, it was impossible to determine whether there was a causal link between the passage of right-to-carry laws and crime rates (2011: 616). Lott and Mustard used observational data instead of experimental data, making it difficult to truly analyze any causal impacts.

Donohue and his colleagues instead suggested that from 1977 until 2006, the most consistent finding was that aggravated assault rates increased where and when RTC laws were enacted (2011: 616).

La Valle and Glover (2012) found that *shall-issue* RTC laws increased violent crime rates, yet their findings suggested an interesting deterrent effect with *may-issue* RTC laws. *May-issue* RTC laws robustly and consistently reduced homicide rates by 20 to 30 percent, while *shall-issue* RTC laws increased outcomes by similar margins (2012: 597). *May-issue* right-to-carry laws involve a particular degree of discrimination in deciding who can or cannot carry a concealed weapon. Understanding this from a conflict theorist's perspective, it is easy to see how giving discretion to concealed weapon permit licensors could lead to situations where certain segments of society may be unfairly discriminated against.

It could be possible that citizens from racial minority groups or lower economic classes could be seen as high-risk populations to grant permits.

Price, Thompson and Dake (2004) found a .491 correlation between percent of population that was African American and firearm homicide rates, after adjusting for confounding variables. This statistic is better understood with the historical contextual knowledge of racial and economic segregation that led to social inequities and increased crime rates among minority populations. Nevertheless, this statistic points toward possible issues that could be involved with high discretion, *may-issue* permits. Lance Stell (2004:45) makes a point that "strict gun control disproportionately increases the risks of violent victimization for less well-off law-abiding citizens," alluding to the fact made by Kleck (2009:1459) that compliance rates (with legislation) are lower among criminals than non-criminals. It may be true that *may-issue* permits reduce crime in ways that *shall-issue* laws do not, but is it worth stripping lower class citizens of their inherent, inalienable right to defend themselves against imminent danger by carrying a concealed weapon legally? Removing this right in a population of people who feel threatened could lead to non-compliance among responsible citizens who would now be considered criminals for carrying weapons that other classes of citizens are given access to.

Lower class, law-abiding citizens may be the only population with a true need for carrying a firearm in order to ensure the security and territorial integrity of their families' space. Imposing *may-issue* and discriminatory gun control measures may be an upper-class attempt at reducing fears of massacres and other accidental shooting events publicized by the media, that are, in actuality, quite rare.

In reality, the most common dangers from criminal gun violence may be to lower class, law abiding citizens living in areas with high levels of criminal shootings, known as gang neighborhoods. Ordinary gun violence, including crimes committed by and against juvenile and adult minorities, does not receive the same publicity as rarer, upper class shootings violence like Columbine (Kappeler and Potter, 2005). Imposing discriminatory "may issue" concealed weapon permits can possibly be understood as a class conflict, resulting from stereotypical assumptions and an unequal access to legislative powers.

As noted in the literature above, a general problem with Lott and Mustard's (1997) conclusion is that it suggests a causal relationship between two variables that are potentially influenced by dozens of confounding variables that change with culture and geography. As a result, the burden of proof is high. A deterrent effect may be present for some individuals and for certain crimes in certain places and at certain times, but it may very well be the opposite for other citizens. As a result, it is tough to answer the question of "Do more guns result in less crime?" The next section focuses on a third outlook that stresses the importance of the lethality of firearms over their potential use as a crime deterrent.

More Guns, More Deaths

Franklin Zimring (2004) took an interesting look at the "More Guns, Less Crime" hypothesis proposed by John Lott and David Mustard. Zimring suggested that it is not important to look at what kind of gun control strategies do or do not work as long as firearms are a contributing factor to the death rate from violent crime (2004: 36). Statistics show that guns are used in a minority of crimes. However, "handgun use increases death rate from violence by a factor of three to five" (2004: 34). Robberies involving a firearm are four times as likely to produce a victim death as non-firearms robbery (2004: 34). Cook (2002) agrees, stating "The ready availability of guns may increase gun use by criminal assailants and thereby increase the lethality of assaults" (2002: 3).

This study references a set of 1,823 interviews with burglars "where 50% reported that the possibility of encountering an armed victim was 'very important' in their decision to employ a gun" (2002: 6). If the concern of gun control legislation is to reduce firearms deaths, the concern should therefore be placed on the lethality of the gun and not the possible effects of legislation on crime deterrence, as the lethal multiplier stems from the gun, not the crime.

Zimring makes the point that “our rate of assault is not exceptional; our death rate from assault is exceptional” (2004: 35). The implication is that in order to reduce lethal violence from crime, policy makers should look at ways to reduce the prevalence of tools that have increased lethality.

Price, Thompson and Dake (2004) came to a similar conclusion stating, “if health promotion specialists are going to be involved in reducing firearms related mortality, they should focus their efforts on reducing the prevalence of firearms” (2004: 281). Their study examined the relationship of sixteen variables including, race, age, presence of gun laws, geographical location... with homicide, suicide, and unintentional firearm deaths.

Firearm prevalence was most strongly associated with firearm suicide death rates with an adjusted correlation of .717 (2004: 276). Firearm prevalence was also correlated with firearm homicide death rates at a level of .516 (2004: 275), and with unintentional firearm deaths at a level of .727 (2004: 277). Firearm prevalence was the most influential category on all three of the dependent variables after adjusting for confounding variables. Combined gun law categories and individual gun law categories were irrelevant for unintentional deaths and suicides, but were marginally and positively correlated with adjusted firearm homicide rates at a level of .311 (2004: 275). These results imply that there is a stronger relationship with gun crimes and *gun prevalence*, than there is with gun crimes and *gun laws*.

Klieve, Barnes and De Leo's (2009) study shows how cultural attitudes can have a stronger effect on reducing and displacing a particular kind of gun violence, than gun legislation. Their study highlighted an Australian buyback program that recovered 640,000 weapons (2009: 288), which had no significant effect on observed decreases in firearm suicides. Suicide rates remained relatively stable while firearm suicide became a lower percentage of all suicides (although it became more common as a male's age increased).

This finding was attributed to cultural rather than legislative reasons, as the firearm suicide rates had been decreasing before the legislation was passed and the decreases accompanying legislation were marginal and only present in data from one geographical location.

Gunnell, Middleton, and Fraenkel (2000), confirm the same finding for a cohort study of males from 1950-1975. The relevance of these two studies is that legislation reducing the prevalence of firearms did not have as large of an effect on citizen behavior as did social and cultural attitudes (2000: 290). Usage of firearms for suicide decreased, but it was a product of culture, and likely “a change in public acceptability”(2000: 290) rather than a legislative effect. This fact coincides with Sutherland and Cressey’s (1978) notions of learned behavior in Differential Association Theory. Seeking acceptance and “group belonging” is most likely not the key concern of a person preoccupied with suicide, but finding an expressive or culturally rebellious acceptable means for self-destructive acts may be a possible reality. If so, a cultural decline in the acceptability and glorification of the firearm may lead to a rise in newer, and possibly more creative or prideful ways of committing suicide.

An example is hanging, a suicide method not associated with corporate industry, media publicity, or state power but rather, a method that was outlawed by the state (Klieve, Barnes and De Leo, 2009:290). These studies point toward interesting solutions for reducing gun violence and massacres in the United States, a country where firearms are readily available and are culturally glorified on a daily basis thanks to regular television programming. These results also speak to where attempts to reduce gun violence should be targeted in terms of geographic location. This also includes possible censorships of gun violence in the media where it glorifies the lethal tool and synonymizes its uses with the success achieved by heroes and villains.

Miller, Hemenway and Azrael (2007) are also part of the “more guns, more deaths” camp, who found that increases in firearm homicide were directly proportional to increases in firearm prevalence (2007: 659). Their study found that “non-firearm homicide rates were not significantly different in states with the highest compared to lowest quartile of firearm prevalence” (2007: 660), showing that firearms have a direct correlation to firearm deaths, and not to homicides and accidental deaths in general.

The importance of this control measure is that it crosses out the extraneous variable that increased firearm and homicide prevalence result from a hyper aggressive culture. Rather, their results suggest that increases in homicides are a result of more firearms. This is a substantial finding for anyone concerned with the cost-benefit relationship between guns and crime reduction in society.

Results from analyses that excluded the 5 states with the highest firearm prevalence were similar to results including all 50 states. This measure of control is important because it ensures that outliers do not have a significant pull on the data, leading to irrelevant conclusions. This was likely a response to a critique (Black and Nagin, 1998: 218) of Lott and Mustard's (1997) results being overly influenced by data from Florida. This study is a careful and controlled response to the more guns, less crime hypothesis.

Methods

The data for this study were obtained from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. Particular states and jurisdictions in the United States will be selected by looking at which jurisdictions have changed from *no-issue* in terms of RTC laws to *shall-issue* in the last 20 years. Based on the selection criteria outlined in *Research Methods for Criminal Justice and Criminology*, the collection strategy for this study will include an analysis of secondary sources (Champion, 2006: 309).

The jurisdictions chosen for this study include Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina and Oklahoma, in addition to the two control states, Washington and Illinois. Data will be collected as far back as 1960 up until 2010. The data were divided up into two categories, "before *shall-issue*" and "after *shall-issue*," which was determined as the year that the particular state implemented legislation to make their state a *shall-issue* RTC state. The actual year where the RTC law changed was not included in the data because the month in which it changed was not determined or fixed from state to state. The data were tabulated and combined to determine the total average violent and property crime rates before and after the change from *no-issue* to *shall-issue*. The data were further stratified by type of crime, so that murder/non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault and burglary can be specifically compared.

Anomie, conflict and labeling theory were active and considered as the data were collected. Going from *no-issue* to *shall-issue* means an increase in the theoretical freedom for the citizens of that particular state, but with this increase in ability to carry concealed weapons is also a potential increase in danger or anomie. Anyone could now be walking around with a handgun on their person.

For those who don't obtain a concealed carry license, their anomie might increase because they could have an increase in fear knowing that complete strangers could be carrying and could use a concealed handgun. On the other hand, for those who do obtain a concealed carry permit, their anomie might dramatically decrease because they are taking control of their personal security and know that they (with the proper training) can possibly win any standard confrontation with a would-be criminal. Before even considering the anomie after a gun owner obtains a CCW, one must first look at the reason for obtaining a permit to carry. As women progressively increase their status in the business and working world, some men might see their masculinity threatened or at the very least feel like they cannot be a man when their significant other is bringing in identical or a higher income. Perhaps this leads to men obtaining a concealed carry permit and carrying a handgun as a way to feel like a man in an increasingly egalitarian society. Or, putting gender aside, perhaps an individual is having a really anomic time in their life and they want to carry a concealed handgun as an expression of this anomie.

Conflict theory is palpable during the data collection and can be seen in the methods used because a change from *no-issue* to *shall-issue* represents the class in power handing over power to the lower class.

Instead of not being allowed to legally carry a concealed handgun and being forced to rely on law enforcement agencies, being allowed to carry a concealed handgun gives citizens a portion of the dominance over their own security. Those in the lowest class, however, do not benefit from this change in legislation because it costs money to submit an application for a permit (money that those who are living from paycheck to paycheck cannot afford to spend on a permit) and they additionally must not be a convicted felon or have documented mental health problems.

Labeling theory will be seen in the differences between crime rates and concealed carriers. In bustling metropolises, simply carrying a concealed handgun could hold enough of a stigma to make the carrier considered deviant, or not following the social norm.

In a more rural state, it might be the exact opposite – those not carrying guns (concealed or otherwise) might be violating the social norm for the specific jurisdiction. The differing social norms and stigma for someone carrying a concealed handgun being deviant in some way might be readily observable in a greater increase or decrease in particular crime rates.

It would be reasonable to assume that in rural states, where it is readily accepted that everyone and their grandmother owns and carries a concealed handgun, there would be a large reduction in the amount of aggravated assault, but the rates of robbery would stay the same. Even before the change from *no-issue* to *shall-issue*, in a rural gun-savvy jurisdiction, it would be known that everyone would own a gun in their household, so the rates of robbery would be low, and the change from “no” to “shall” issue would not change anything in regard to that particular crime. But now that people can carry a gun concealed on their person, and it is known that everyone would do this, there would very likely be a large decrease in the rate of aggravated assault. Average crime rates were used to quantify and determine what, if any, significant effect a change from *no-issue* to *shall-issue* in a particular state has in terms of crime rates.

Conclusions

This study performed a comparative analysis of violent crime rates and property crime rates relevant to changes in RTC laws. Six states were selected based on their change from being *no-issue* to *shall-issue* in the early to mid-1990s. In addition, Washington State and Illinois were used as controls because neither changed their RTC laws. Washington has remained a *shall-issue* state during the time interval studied, while Illinois has remained a *no-issue*.

This study originally looked at both violent and property crime rates averaged from 1960-2010. These data can be seen in Index 1. In addition, the data were further stratified by leaving off decades. Finally, the data were separated such that the years examined before the change in RTC laws equaled the amount of years after the RTC laws were modified. The reason several different modes of analysis became necessary was because certain decades or spans of time had significant impacts and pulls on the data as a whole. In this case, the pull seemed to be related to politics and unquantifiable changes in the criminal justice system that ended up being a variable that couldn't be controlled.

As a result, in order to control the data and make it as reliable and valid as possible for the issue of study, using the same number of years before the change in RTC laws and after became the most consistent time period in which to collect crime rate averages.

This also makes sure only the closest and most relevant years of data (approximately the 15 years before and after the change in RTC laws from *no-issue* to *shall-issue*) were included, rather than having irrelevant data pulls from the 1960s affecting analysis of gun laws from the 1990s.

A significant warp on the data that was caused by reasons that are irrelevant to this study is the war on drugs. Violent crime rates were 100-300% less in the 1960s than the average crime rates of the 1970s to 2010. This occurred in every state examined, meaning individual state politics weren't the reason crime rates were so low, but instead federal policies such as the DEA's "War on Drugs," which possibly led to drastic increases in crime rates, as specific activities that were not enforced before the 1970s now became rigorously enforced. Violent crime rates and property crime rates both drastically increased after the 1960s, and could be best explained by a change in law enforcement policies which in turn forced criminals to go through new and different means to acquire the drugs they desired. Property and violent crimes now needed to occur in order for criminals to fund and obtain previously easy to get drugs.

The results indicated that there was little uniformity from state to state in terms of changes in violent or property crime rates before and after the change from *no-issueto shall-issue*. This hints at the fact that gun laws were not a factor in crime rates. Arizona, Kentucky, and North Carolina showed decreases in both violent crime rates and property crime rates. In terms of violent crime rates, Arizona showed a decrease of 10.94%, Kentucky showed a decrease of 21.86% and North Carolina had a decrease of 6.95% (Index 2). Property crime rates for Arizona decreased by 22.09%, 10% for Kentucky, and decreased by 2.34% for North Carolina.

Increases in both violent and property crime rates were shown in Arkansas and Mississippi, with violent crime rates increasing by 13.18% in Arkansas and increasing by 21.37% in Mississippi. Property crime rates increased by 1.7% in Arkansas and 42.49% in Mississippi. The only state that had an increase in violent crime with a decrease in property crime was Oklahoma, which had an increase of 5.19% in terms of violent crime rates, and a drop of 16.87% in property crime rates.

The data collected also include changes in individual crime rates, specifically murder/non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault and burglary.

Murder and non-negligent manslaughter showed decreases in every state as the individual states changed their RTC laws. The 15-20 years (exact number of years is consistent within each state) before the change from *no-issue* to *shall-issue* were compared with the 15-20 years after. Some changes in murder rates were as large as a decrease in Arizona from 10.4 to 7.45 per 100,000 persons, while some were as small as the changes in Mississippi which changed from 10.6 to 9.9. Every state except for Mississippi showed a decrease of more than 2 persons per every 100,000, which is between a 10-30% decrease (depending on the state). Forcible rape results were mixed, with marginal increases shown in Oklahoma, Mississippi, Kentucky and Arkansas. Arizona and North Carolina both had decreases in forcible rape rates (Index 3). Aggravated Assault rates were also mixed, with Arizona, Kentucky and North Carolina showing significant decreases, while Arkansas, Mississippi, and Oklahoma showed significant increases. Burglary rates, showed extreme and significant increases in Arkansas increasing from 435.36 to 1006.8, and in Mississippi where the rate increased from 748.25 to 1178.95 per 100,000 citizens. It is possible that in areas where the effects of poverty are extreme, that RTC laws may not effect or reduce burglary rates, as a result of citizens not having enough money to purchase firearms. It is also possible that in states where lockup laws on firearms have been enacted, that firearms when present in the home act as a lucrative item; they are not readily available enough to provide defense, but available enough to steal. This is another possible reason why burglary rate increases could be so extreme in some states. Arizona, Kentucky, North Carolina and Oklahoma showed significant decreases in burglary rates.

Illinois and Washington State were used as control states because both states have had the same RTC laws (Illinois is, and has been, *no-issue* while Washington State is and has been *shall-issue*) for the period that was studied. In terms of violent crime rates, both Washington and Illinois showed decreases. Washington had a decrease of 23.64% and Illinois had a decrease of 25.06%.

It is important to note that Illinois had the highest rate of violent crimes of any of the states that were studied. Illinois decreased from a violent crime rate of 884.45 to 662.8. Of the states investigated in this study, none of their "before" or "after" average violent crime rates were higher than 605.69.

Both Illinois and Washington showed decreases in property crime rates as well, with decreases in Washington equaling 23.25% and 29.78% in Illinois. For the specific crime of murder/non-negligent manslaughter, Washington decreased from 5.5 to 3.45 per 100,000 persons and Illinois decreased from 11.15 to 7.75. Both showed decreases in forcible rape. In Washington, forcible rape decreased from 56.6 to 44.6 per 100,000 persons and 34 to 31 in Illinois. Aggravated assault rates and burglary rates significantly decreased in both Illinois and Washington. It is particularly interesting that the two control states show decreases across the board in all individual crimes analyzed by this study. It could be that having consistent laws enables a community to adapt and incorporate the law into their culture, therefore allowing for crime reduction as adaption to crime takes place among the citizenry. It could also be that an unrelated third variable is affecting the two control states in a similar manner.

It is important to note that for both of the control states there were reductions in both violent and property crimes of more than 20% from the "before" to the "after" period, which was roughly the same period of time used in the other states. This shows that there are additional variables not considered or accounted for that are influencing the violent and property crime rates during the period of time studied, and that the change in the other states might not be related to the change in RTC laws, but instead could be a result of other or a mix of variables.

In the six states that went from no-issue to shall-issue, there were significant decreases in murder and non-negligent manslaughter, which shows a correlation between a reduction in gun control and a reduction in murder. Rape didn't show any statistically significant changes due to the fact that it decreased in two states and increased in four states, with some of the changes being statistically insignificant.

Looking at this study's results through the lens of conflict theorists, it can be said that change in legislature from *no-issue* to *shall-issue* gave certain citizens an ability to protect themselves from particularly violent crimes, such as murder/non-negligent manslaughter.

This is relevant to conflict theory because moving from *no-issue* to *shall-issue*, rather than *may-issue*, removes the power of human bias from the permitting process. This benefits the poor and minorities, people that would have the highest likelihood of encountering violent crime, but have the lowest likelihood of being given *may-issue* permits.

The fact that decreases in murder rates accompanied decreases on legislative controls of handguns, hints at the idea that letting more citizens carry firearms on their person possibly saved them from homicide. However, violent crime across the board did not show decreases, so this availability for lethal defense applies specifically and only to murder. This result was confirmed in the National Research Council's (NRC) report in 2005 on RTC laws and crime rates (Aneja, Donohue and Zhang, 2011).

Deterrence theory and specifically Routine Activities theory could also be found to be relevant to the results. With the exception of Oklahoma, all states showed matching effects in violent and property crime rights, with both increasing or both decreasing after the change in legislation. What is important here is that on average, there was not displacement from violent crimes to property crimes, or vice versa. This shows that for some reason, in each state except Oklahoma (which showed an increase in violent and a decrease in property crime), there were factors that across-the-board altered crime in the same direction. Specifically this is the case in North Carolina, Kentucky and Arizona, where crime rates decreased for both the averaged violent and property crimes. It is possible that increases in technology produced an increase in the quantity of protection against crime in the form of cameras, alarms and other measures. Routine Activities Theory refers to this as an increase in available guardians, which in return reduces the quantity of available suitable targets.

However, this assumes that the criminal is making a choice to commit a crime, weighing options and analyzing cause and effect. If this is true, in certain cases (not all instances of crime), it would explain why there are uniform decreases in crime within these states; because some measure or variable is increasing the certainty of getting caught. The fact that Mississippi and Arkansas show increases in both violent and property crime possibly shows that for some reason in those states the availability of targets increased with a lack of guardians making crime more desirable. These states are known for being poorer than others, and it could be that technology was adapted into criminal deterrence policies later on than other states in the study because of costs. The increased access to handguns means that there are likely more handguns in homes and on the street. It is possible that a handgun, in the hands of an untrained or ill-equipped individual, could serve as inducement for theft and violent theft.

It is also possible that the increase in handguns stimulated by the legislative change caused criminals to carry weapons that they previously didn't feel the need to carry, and that this is why crime rates increased in these states. Deterrence theory depends on personal choice and this is not always sufficient to explain crime. It could be possible that changes and variations between the states is a result of culture.

Labeling theory becomes relevant when looking at unique cultures from state to state. This study did not control for, or find a way to measure or accurately identify different cultural attitudes on a state-by-state basis. This was not the purpose of the study. However, it is possible that in Mississippi and Arkansas, carrying a handgun is labeled as deviant or is too costly. The passage of the law might have done nothing more than make gun carrying available. The extent to which citizens actually carried around concealed weapons could be equal to what it was before the legislative changes in the early 1990s. However, it is also possible that handguns are labeled as normal and a part of everyday life in these states. It could be that laws banning the carrying of handguns were generally disregarded before legislation. The point is that because of cultural variance from state to state, it is hard to see the true extent to which the RTC laws actually affected handgun behavior. What can be inferred is that the effects of crime drops or crime increases were consistent within five of the states. Pointing to some variable, possibly a unique culture or label, which pulled the data in one direction or influenced the implication of RTC laws and/or other laws and social policies relevant to crime is a temptation. In reality, it is likely a combination of complex factors.

This study also analyzed Anomie Theory, specifically two types of strain reduction relevant to RTC laws. One of the types, which focused on creating identity through carrying a handgun, therefore reduces strain associated with a loss of identity. The other type focused on reduction of strain caused by fear of crime. Both theories fit into the results. The reduction in murder/non-negligent manslaughter, correlated with states changing from *no-issue* to *shall-issue* RTC, possibly points to the fact that carrying handguns allowed citizens better control over defense of their lives. It can be inferred that there is a correlation between *shall-issue* permits and reduced homicide, possibly allowing for citizens' better personal defense against murder. However, the fact that RTC laws did not uniformly increase or decrease total crime across the board, from state to state, points to the fact that the laws may not have actually been designed to meet and treat a problem, but rather to serve some other purpose.

Results from Mississippi, where there were large and profound increases in crime, could be explained by saying that the legislation was passed and used by members of society who did not need to carry weapons to deter crime, because they are not encumbered by crime, or because it did not function as a deterrent there. Carrying a gun and the desire for the *shall-issue* laws, could be the product of individuals who feel that doing so is “cool” or serves the purpose of repairing a damaged identity. Possibly for males, handguns serve the purpose of restoring damaged masculine identities in an American culture that is becoming increasingly progressive and egalitarian when compared to its roots, which favored white males. It’s possible the passing a law that enables handgun carrying, when it is not needed, actually causes an increase in crime, as criminals carry increased firepower to deal with more citizens packing heat. The opposite is also true. It could be that in a state like Kentucky, where crime decreased after the passage of *shall-issue* laws, that needs of citizens were adequately addressed, and that allowing the carrying of firearms in that specific state, caused a reduction in crime. The law could have adequately addressed an anomic problem relevant to crime. It is also possible that the laws were irrelevant or that their negative or positive effects were *outweighed* by a third variable, therefore making a correlation inverse to a true and hidden causal factor.

When it comes to how the data collected in this study can be used to influence social and public policy, many interesting connections and implications can be found. Since the changes in violent crime rates and property crime rates were not consistent in terms of decreasing or increasing within each state, it means that each state should look at the change from *no-issue* to *shall-issue* separately because its correlation or causation is different depending on a particular state’s culture, geography, and many other differing variables. This means that any nationwide gun control issues should be viewed skeptically because, as can be seen in the data collected in this study, different states reveal different results from gun control legislation. Some states have increases in property crime rates and violent crime rates after changing from *no-issue* to *shall-issue*, while others had the opposite effect occur. However, when looking specifically at the effects of murder/non-negligent manslaughter for the “before” and “after,” there was a consistent decrease across all the states when changing from *no-issue* to *shall-issue*. This same change was also seen in the two control states that did not have a change in legislation, meaning that it is possible that the changes resulted not from the RTC laws legislation, but instead from a nationwide cultural shift.

It is also important to consider that the world as a whole, especially the United States, is increasingly interconnected thanks to technologies such as the Internet.

It is very possible that changes in legislation that result in more news coverage of concealed-carrying citizens from one state shooting a criminal have an impact on other states that are no-issue states such as Illinois, meaning that even though there was no change in legislation for Illinois itself, that doesn't mean the changes from other states didn't cause, in some part, its decrease in violent crime and property crime.

The literature mentioned both dishonesty from firearm dealers and gun theft as a problem contributing to firearm violence. Although this study did not specifically investigate or focus on gun theft, a policy recommendation that may be useful in reducing the gun theft and gun violence in general would be to create state legislation that requires insurance for purchasing firearms. Creating firearm ownership insurance would do several things to curb gun violence. First, because of its added cost, it would have the potential to limit and reduce the quantity of persons who purchase firearms purely for entertainment purposes. In essence, there would be more firearm purchases where citizens are buying the gun because of a need for safety or protection. This in itself might limit the turnover rate between those who buy guns at gun shows, or gun stores and sell those firearms to third parties who may or may not have the qualifications. Firearm insurance could also have the potential to increase the longevity of communication and connection with private gun owners and regulatory agencies. It would create enforcement and reporting mechanisms that could reduce a gun's ability to hide and disappear into the black market through third party sales.

A private firearm insurance legislation would allow for the creation of corporations which would have an incentive to collect and file claims against dealers and individuals who are not following gun distribution and sales law. This takes the enforcement burden off of government agencies, as insurance companies know that they can make a profit, and therefore they have an incentive to collect on claims of firearm sales malpractice. This reduces corruption and cost for state agencies. It means a potentially higher cost paid by the private citizen for each firearm owned. It also means that firearms would not have a process that mirrors the acquisition of a shovel that can be sold to any person after it is bought from the store, but instead, that a gun and private sales involving guns would have a more rigorous and thorough, yet burdensome process of exchanging hands legally.

Any illegal changes of hand could be enforced swiftly by insurance corporations that make a profit off of doing so. The burdens of a program like this fall mainly upon the gun owner who wishes not to pay more for his or her firearm or cannot do so.

Suggesting any kind of regulation for firearm ownership may present a threat against constitutional rights. The benefits of a program like this however, reduce gun theft, reduce gun distribution malpractice, and reduce cost and corruption for government agencies.

It is important to emphasize that there is a correlation and possibly a causation between a change from *no-issue* to *shall-issue* in terms of right to carry laws and the amount of murder. Even though some of the states saw an increase in overall average crime rates after the change in RTC laws, even these states had a decrease in murder/non-negligent manslaughter. This finding is, however, mitigated by the fact that the two states that did not change their right to carry laws during the time period studied also had their overall violent crime rates decrease as well as their murder rates. Each individual state had a different response to the change from *no-issue* to *shall-issue*, meaning that a flexible solution is necessary in order to best reduce crime rates in the United States. On the other hand, it would also appear that certain specific violent crimes such as murder do decrease across the board when changing RTC laws.

Further research is likely needed to determine whether unaccounted for variables are the result of this nationwide decrease, or if right-to-carry laws have a causal relationship with specific violent crimes. From here, further individual crimes, such as robbery or larceny-theft could be examined, gaining additional insights into which crime rates are most changed by a variation in RTC laws from *no-issue* to *shall-issue*. Additionally, an international comparison would be incredibly beneficial and useful in determining whether or not countries with similar RTC laws (but a vastly different cultures) have similar violent crime rates and property crime rates. Japan and Sweden have very different laws in terms of gun-control and right to carry laws – looking at their average crime rates and comparing those to the United States would be highly valuable, given more time and resources. Linking a change in RTC laws to a decrease or increase in accidental handgun deaths would also be a notable addition to this study, because it would show unintended side-effects of RTC legislation.

VCR 1960-1993	460. 0794	VCR 1970- 1993	560. 6167		PCR 1960- 1994	5830 .471	PCR 1970- 1994	6725 .613
VRC 1995-2010	539. 35	VCR 1980- 1993	610. 4286		PCR 1996- 2010	5282 .706	PCR 1980- 1994	6726 .621
VCR Same# Before 1978-1993	605. 694				PCR Before	6780 .55		
VCR After 1995- 2010	539. 35				PCR After	5282 .70		

Index 1

Arizona

Arkansas

VCR 1960-1994	315. 094	VCR 1970- 1994	381. 188		PCR 1960- 1994	2769 .297	PCR 1970- 1994	3371 .6
VRC 1996-2010	492. 767	VCR 1980- 1994	435. 3667		PCR 1996- 2010	3848 .313	PCR 1980- 1994	3784 .007
VCR Same# Before 1980-1994	435. 367				PCR Before	3784 .007		
VCR After 1996- 2010	492. 767				PCR After	3848 .313		

Kentucky

VCR 1960-1994	256.8 228	VCR 1970	310.9 88		PCR 1960-1994	2411. 1	PCR 1970	2779. 92
VRC 1996-2010	281.6 533	VCR 1980	360.4 333		PCR 1996-2010	2634. 433	PCR 1980	2924. 013
VCR Same Before 1980-1994	360.4 333				PCR Before	2924. 013		
VCR After 1996- 2010	281.6 533				PCR After	2634. 433		

Mississippi

VCR 1960-1989	240.56	VCR 1970	297.09		PCR 1960-1989	1911.507	PCR 1970	2493.875
VCR 1991-2010	368.11	VCR 1980	295.47		PCR 1991-2010	3656.375	PCR 1980	3099.78
VCR Same# Before	303.2895				PCR Same# Before	2566.021		
VCR After	368.11				PCR After	3656.375		

North Carolina

VCR 1960-1994	421.5943	VCR 1970-1994	483.688		PCR 1960-1994	3107.766	PCR 1970	3824.432
VCR 1996-2010	488.6867	VCR 1980-1994	525.1667		PCR 1996-2010	4279.1	PCR 1980	4381.853
VCR Same# Before	525.1667				PCR Same# Before	4381.853		
VCR After	488.6867				PCR After	4279.1		

Oklahoma

VCR 1960-1994	331.5771	VCR 1970-1994	410.14		PCR 1960-1994	3717.377	PCR 1970	4384.876
VCR 1996-2010	516.3533	VCR 1980-1994	490.8933		PCR 1996-2010	4083.76	PCR 1980	4912.713
VCR Same# Before 1980-1994	490.8933				PCR Same# Before	4912.713		
VCR After	516.3533				PCR After	4083.76		

Control States

Washington

Illinois

VCR Same# Before 1980-1994	487.8				PCR Before	5983.5		
VCR After 1996-2010	372.5				PCR After	4592.4		

VCR Same# Before 1980-1994	884.45				PCR Before	5063		
VCR After 1996-2010	662.8				PCR After	3555.3		

Index 2

Arizona

Violent Crime Rates Before (1978-1993) to After (1995-2010)– Decrease of 66.288 = **10.94% decrease**

Property Crime Rates Before (1978-1993) to After (1995-2010)–Decrease of 1497.84 = **22.09% decrease**

Arkansas

Violent Crime Rates (1980-1994) to After (1996-2010)– Increase of 57.4 = **13.18% increase**

Property Crime Rates Before (1980-1994) to After (1996-2010)– Increase of 64.306 = **1.70% increase**

Kentucky

Violent Crime Rates Before (1980-1994) to After (1996-2010)– Decrease of 78.78 = **21.86% decrease**

Property Crime Rates Before (1980-1994) to After (1996-2010)– Decrease of 289.58 = **10% decrease**

Mississippi

Violent Crime Rates Before (1970-1989) to After (1991-2010)– Increase of 64.82 = **21.37% increase**

Property Crime Rates Before (1970-1989) to After (1991-2010)– Increase of 1090.35 = **42.49% increase**

North Carolina

Violent Crime Rates Before (1980-1994) to After (1996-2010)– Decrease of 36.48 = **6.95% decrease**

Property Crime Rates Before (1980-1994) to After (1996-2010)– Decrease of 102.75
= **2.34% decrease**

Oklahoma

Violent Crime Rates Before (1980-1994) to After (1996-2010)– Increase of 25.46 =
5.19% increase

Property Crime Rates Before (1980-1994) to After (1996-2010)– Decrease of 828.95
= **16.87% decrease**

Washington

Violent Crime Rates Before (1980-1994) to After (1996-2010)- Decrease of 115.3 =
23.64% decrease

Property Crime Rates Before (1980-1994) to After (1996-2010)– Decrease of 1391.1
= **23.25% decrease**

Illinois

Violent Crime Rates Before (1980-1994) to After (1996-2010)– Decrease of 221.65 =
25.06% decrease

Property Crime Rates Before (1980-1994) to After (1996-2010)– Decrease of 1507.7
= **29.78% decrease**

Index 3

Individual Crime Rate Comparison

Arizona- From (1978-1993), to (1995-2010)

- Murder and Non Negligent Manslaughter : Decreased from 10.40, to 7.45

-Forcible Rape: Decreased from 40.60, to 32.55]

-Aggravated Assault: Decreased from 399.28, to 349.45

-Burglary: Decreased from 1773, to 1047.

Arkansas- From (1980-1994), to (1996-2010)

-Murder and Non Negligent Manslaughter: Decreased from 9.113, to 6.673

-Forcible Rape: Increased from 33.907, to 39.66

-Aggravated Assault: Increased from 297.4, to 354.15

-Burglary: Increased from 435.36, to 1006.8

Kentucky- From (1980-1994), to (1996-2010)

-Murder and Non Negligent Manslaughter: Decreased from 7.42, to 4.933

- Forcible Rape: Increased from 25.547, to 30.593

-Aggravated Assault: Decreased from 242.6, to 160.6

-Burglary: Decreased from 851, to 664

Mississippi- From (1970-1989), to (1991-2010)

- Murder and Non Negligent Manslaughter: Decreased from 10.6, to 9.9
- Forcible Rape: Increased from 23.85, to 38.75
- Aggravated Assault: Increased from 162.1, to 175.8
- Burglary: Increased from 748.25, to 1178.95

North Carolina- From (1980-1994), to (1996-2010)

- Murder and Non Negligent Manslaughter: Decreased from 9.447, to 6.673
- Forcible Rape: Decreased from 28.02, to 26.993
- Aggravated Assault: Decreased from 367.98, to 306.1
- Burglary: Decreased from 1392.01, to 1226.49

Oklahoma- From (1980-1994), to (1996-2010)

- Murder and Non Negligent Manslaughter: Decreased from 7.96, to 5.853
- Forcible Rape: Increased from 41.12, to 42.787
- Aggravated Assault: Increased from 322.86, to 377.17
- Burglary: Decreased from 1534, to 1030.7

Washington- From (1980-1994), to (1996-2010)

- Murder and Non Negligent Manslaughter: Decreased from 5.5, to 3.45
- Forcible Rape: Decreased from 56.6, to 44.6
- Aggravated Assault: Decreased from 288.3, to 220.9
- Burglary: Decreased from 1453, to 938.9

Illinois- From (1980-1994), to (1996-2010)

- Murder and Non Negligent Manslaughter: Decreased from 11.15, to 7.75
- Forcible Rape: Decreased from 34.05, to 31
- Aggravated Assault: Decreased from 469.45, to 406
- Burglary: Decreased from 1282.35, to 750.4

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